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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Eric Wynn and Brad Haddy appeal from judgments in 
criminal cases entered by the District of New Jersey after a 
jury found them guilty of conspiracy to commit securities 
fraud and of substantive crimes relating to manipulation of 
the stock market. Wynn was also convicted of wire fraud. 
After sentencing, Wynn and Haddy appealed, raising a 
number of assertions of error. Two questions -- whether 
the indictment contained duplicitous counts and whether 
investor reliance is a requisite of proof to convict under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 -- require 
discussion. Several other issues, involving constructive 
amendment of the indictment, statute of limitations, 
severance, willfulness as an element of the securities law 
violation, character evidence of a witness, prosecutorial 
misconduct, admission of evidence, jury instructions, 
competency and sentencing, are without merit and do not 
warrant further discussion.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In his brief, Haddy set forth these additional issues as: 
 
       1. The government failed to prove that he acted willfully, an 
       essential element of the crimes of securities fraud and conspiracy 
to 
       commit securities fraud; 
 
       2. His right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the district court's 
       denial of his motion for a separate trial; 
 
       3. Prosecutorial misconduct, consisting of the unauthorized use of 
       a grand jury subpoena, offering testimony known to be untrue, lack 
       of a "good faith basis" for asking certain questions of a witness, 
       making baseless arguments that certain assumptions were 
       "incorrect and incomplete" or "misleading," offering a misleading 
       summary chart, and interfering with his attempts to interview 
       witnesses, prejudiced him and required a mistrial; 
 
       4. The district court erred in excluding testimony by opinion 
       witnesses who would impeach the credibility of a principal witness 
       for the prosecution and thus denied him his Sixth Amendment right 
       to compulsory process; 
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We will affirm the judgments entered. We concludefirst, 
that the indictment does not suffer from the vice of 
duplicity. The relevant statutory and regulatory language 
allow charging an overall scheme to defraud in a single 
count of an indictment. Second, criminal liability under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act does not 
require deception of and reliance by an identifiable buyer or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       5. The district court erred by admitting financial records obtained 
       pursuant to grand jury subpoena in direct contravention of the 
       Right to Financial Privacy Act; 
 
       6. The district court erred by admitting into evidence recordings 
of 
       intercepted wire communications and evidence derived from these 
       communications; 
 
       7. The government failed to apply for or obtain authorization or 
       approval to use or disclose the contents of the intercepted wire 
       communications before the grand jury; 
 
       8. The district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 
concerning 
       the time at which a sale of a security is deemed complete, venue, 
       legal responsibility, and the need for showing deception and 
investor 
       reliance; and erred in charging the jury that it might return a 
       verdict of guilty as to Count I (or Counts II, III and IV) without 
       finding unanimously that one of the overt acts charged in the 
       indictment occurred during the limitation period; and, 
 
       9. The district court erred in sentencing him by not reducing his 
       sentence to take into consideration that conspiracy is a "lesser 
       included offense" of the continuing criminal enterprise and by 
       incorrectly using the "gross gain secured by the conspiracy as a 
       whole, [by] the co-conspirators and those persons and accounts 
       which they controlled" to compute the amount of loss. 
 
In Wynn's brief, these issues are described as: 
 
       1. The district court erred in permitting the government to 
       constructively amend the indictment by altering the theory of the 
       government presented to the grand jury that Wynn's conduct was 
       per se unlawful, to an urging before the petit jury that he engaged 
       in lawful activity with a corrupt and manipulative intent; and, 
 
       2. The district court erred in determining that the government met 
       its burden of proving Wynn's mental competency by concluding that 
       the panic disorder suffered by him did not render him unable to 
       assist in his defense. 
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seller of securities. The statute's objective of maintaining 
the integrity of the stock market forbids deceitful practices 
without mention of whether investors relied upon the 
manipulative devices in connection with a securities 
transaction. 
 
Our jurisdiction is granted by 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
I. 
 
We review the facts in a light favorable to the 
government, the verdict winner. 
 
A. The Scheme 
 
In approximately 1987, Eric Wynn and Barry Davis 
formed a company called Princeton Financial Consultants 
to raise capital for companies and to promote stocks. 
Through this entity, Wynn and Davis masterminded and 
directed a number of securities trading scams by designing 
a plan to artificially raise the prices of particular securities, 
known as penny stocks. Penny stocks, generally valued at 
under $5.00 a share, are traded on the over-the-counter 
market through the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation system (NASDAQ). 
 
Princeton employees called on brokers and traders 
throughout the country touting different stocks. The 
participation of collaborating stockbrokers was essential to 
the effectiveness of the scheme. One of the brokers who 
followed the Princeton/Wynn recommendations was Brad 
Haddy, who sold securities through the Minneapolis 
brokerage firm of L'Argent Securities. 
 
The manipulation involved four basic steps: (1) control 
the quantity of stock available for trading; (2) generate 
demand for the stock; (3) raise the price of the stock; and 
(4) sell out at a large profit. 
 
Control of the supply of securities was gained by "boxing" 
the initial public offerings ("IPOs") of securities in particular 
companies. Boxing refers to an allocation of almost all of 
the available stock to accounts controlled by "players" -- 
those who had agreed to trade the stock per the direction 
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of Wynn. One directive required that when the after-trading 
market commenced -- the public trading that occurs after 
the close of the IPO -- the players could not sell the stock 
until Wynn gave the go-ahead. With this restriction, Wynn 
was able to control the supply of stock which, in turn, 
enabled him to regulate the price of the stock. 
 
Step two, generation of demand, was primarily 
accomplished through bribery of brokers. Colluding brokers 
sold securities to their customers at prices and from 
brokerage firms designated by Wynn. The brokers were 
then instructed to hold the particular stock off the market 
for a period of time (usually six months). In exchange, the 
brokers received various inducements, including cash, 
stock below the market price, guaranteed profits and 
promises of participation in future deals. Another way 
Wynn created demand for a particular stock was by secretly 
advising brokers of impending mergers of certain 
companies before public announcement of the event. 
 
The next step, the price increase, was realized through 
pre-arranged and restricted trading in which selected 
brokers bought stock at steadily increasing prices -- again, 
as directed by Wynn. 
 
Once the price of the manipulated securities rose to 
certain levels, the inflated value was maintained through 
deals with "market maker" brokerage firms. These firms 
represent themselves to the investing public as being 
willing to sell and trade risky securities. Wynn induced 
certain market makers to set their buy (bid) and sell (ask) 
for some securities at prices in accordance with his 
instructions in exchange for guaranteed trading profits. By 
manufacturing a demand for these securities, the 
participants insured their personal profits occasioned by 
transactions in these securities. 
 
The manipulations detailed in the indictment concern the 
use of the services of Sheffield Securities, a brokerage firm 
in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Sheffield was run by Ronald 
Martini, who, despite being barred from participation in the 
securities business, was a secret owner of Sheffield. Wynn 
entered into an agreement with the principals of Sheffield 
which allowed him to dominate the initial public offerings of 
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stocks in certain shell companies underwritten by Sheffield. 
Wynn would also be permitted to direct the after market 
trading in these particular securities. 
 
Three security offerings in particular epitomize the scope 
of the illegal activity and are the subjects of counts 2, 3 and 
4 of the indictment. 
 
B. Count 2 - Vista Capital Corp. 
 
The first stock that Wynn and Davis manipulated 
through Sheffield was Vista Capital Corporation, a company 
engaged in an IPO. In filings with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Vista was represented as a blind 
pool, a company with no actual or anticipated business 
operations. Vista's status was, however, misrepresented. 
During the period of the IPO, Wynn arranged for a merger 
between Vista and a film company called Bima 
Entertainment. 
 
Wynn's plan was to raise money for Vista through an 
offering of its stock, as a result of which Vista would 
become a public company. Wynn would then trade Vista 
securities on the OTC market in a manner that would 
insure that the price of Vista would rise, enabling the 
players to make a substantial amount of money. As 
planned, the price of Vista rose $.11 per share within the 
first month of aftermarket trading. 
 
In line with the four-step design, Wynn controlled the 
supply of Vista stock by boxing the Vista IPO -- allocating 
the securities issued to accounts set up at Sheffield. 
Although the Vista prospectus stated that Sheffield, the 
underwriter, would make the final decisions concerning 
stock distribution during the IPO, it was actually Wynn who 
directed the specifics of the offering. When investors outside 
Wynn's affiliations requested Vista stock, they were denied 
the opportunity to participate in the trading. Wynn was 
able to regulate the trading in the Vista IPO stock partly 
because Sheffield maintained control over the actual Vista 
stock certificates. If a "non-playing" customer tried to have 
Vista stock transferred and sold, Sheffield's clearing agent 
would so advise Sheffield, who passed on the information to 
Wynn. The only stock certificate transfers that Sheffield 
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authorized the clearing agent to effectuate were those 
allocated to accounts associated with Wynn. 
 
Wynn generated the demand for the Vista stock by 
offering inducements or bribes to brokers to have their 
customers buy the stock. One broker, John Marsala, 
testified that Wynn asked him to have his customers buy 
Vista stock and hold it off the market. In return, Marsala 
was offered 100,000 Vista warrants2 for himself. Although 
he opted out of participation, he observed another broker 
putting a stock certificate into his briefcase. Wynn advised 
Marsala that what he witnessed was a broker receiving the 
same warrants that had been promised to Marsala if he had 
participated in the Vista deal. 
 
Bribes were not the only means by which Wynn induced 
brokers to buy Vista stock. He also encouraged 
participation by offering non-public inside information. In 
the case of Vista, brokers, including Haddy, were told that 
the company would be merging prior to the close of the IPO. 
Wynn was able to represent the Vista/Bima merger as a 
certainty because he had arranged the merger through his 
consulting company, Skyline Capital Corp. 
 
Although the Vista/Bima merger was arranged before the 
close of the Vista IPO, the Vista prospectus was not timely 
amended to disclose the information. An expert for the SEC 
testified that if a blind pool company finds a probable 
merger candidate before the close of its IPO, the company 
must stop distributing its securities and file a post-effective 
amendment with the SEC. Notice to the agency is required 
because a potential merger would amount to a fundamental 
change affecting decisions of investors. 
 
Wynn, Davis and Haddy and other players eventually 
sold their Vista stock at a large profit. 
 
C. Count III - Castleton Investors Corp. 
 
The second stock manipulated through Wynn's control of 
Sheffield was Castleton Investors Corp., another shell 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A warrant is a right to acquire stock at a defined future time and at 
a specified price. 
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company. Castleton became a public company through an 
IPO underwritten by Sheffield in 1986. In late June, 1988, 
Wynn was advised that a security guard anti-terrorism 
business owned by G. Gordon Liddy3 wanted to merge with 
Castleton. Sheffield expressed its willingness to sell Liddy a 
majority of the free-trading Castleton stock currently owned 
by Sheffield customers. 
 
Wynn took over the helm of the Liddy deal. His 
consulting company, Skyline, entered into an agreement 
with Liddy for a 30-day exclusive right to find a merger 
candidate for the Liddy company. 
 
Once Wynn lined up the expected merger of Castleton 
and Liddy, he and his coconspirators began manipulating 
the price of stock using the familiar four step process. 
About 80% of the free-trading stock was acquired by the 
"players" from Sheffield customers who were not told of the 
merger. 
 
Haddy was among the brokers promised Castleton stock 
in exchange for agreeing to have his customers buy a large 
block of the stock. Two days after a tape-recorded 
conversation in which Wynn assured Haddy that he would 
receive stock, Haddy and his L'Argent customers bought 
500,000 shares of Castleton common stock. 
 
Demand for Castleton stock was then created by 
publicizing the intended merger between the company and 
Liddy. The announcement resulted in additional buying. 
Sheffield, acting in accordance with Wynn's instructions as 
to bid and ask prices, then traded the stock in conformity 
with the previously arranged deals. Profits were thus 
guaranteed. 
 
D. Count IV - Bellatrix Corp. 
 
Count IV charged a manipulation scheme involving 
securities from the Bellatrix Corporation, also a blind pool 
company engaged in an IPO underwritten by Sheffield. The 
pattern in the Bellatrix trading mirrored that of the Vista 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. There is no suggestion that Liddy was in any way involved in 
wrongdoing. 
 
                                9 
  
stock manipulation -- "box" the IPO, manufacture demand, 
raise the price through controlled trading, and sell out at a 
profit. Similarly, the fact of Bellatrix' impending merger 
with Gamenet, a computer company, was not disclosed to 
the SEC. 
 
The Bellatrix manipulation was interrupted on the second 
day of after market trading when the FBI executed search 
warrants at Wynn's home and, on the next day, at the 
offices of Sheffield Securities. 
 
E. The Prosecution 
 
On November 15, 1993, a federal grand jury in the 
District of New Jersey returned an indictment charging Eric 
Wynn, Brad Haddy, Anthony Nandino, Irwin Frankel and 
Perry Constantinou with conspiracy to commit securities 
fraud contrary to 15 U.S.C. S S 77q(a) and 77x (Securities 
Act of 1933) and 15 U.S.C. S S 78j(b) (section 10(b)) and 78ff 
(Securities Exchange Act of 1934) and 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b- 
5 (Rule 10b-5) in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371 (Count I); and, 
with execution of schemes to defraud in connection with 
transactions in three different securities (Counts II through 
IV). Wynn was charged in nine additional wire fraud 
counts. 
 
After a six-month trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts 
against Wynn and Haddy on all charges.4  Post-trial motions 
were denied.5 Haddy was sentenced to 27 months' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The jury found Nandino not guilty on Count IV but could not reach a 
verdict on the remaining counts. Constantinou was acquitted of all 
charges against him. Frankel pled guilty prior to trial. 
 
Other coconspirators, Barry Davis, Ronald Martini, John LaSala, Allen 
Weinstein, Ronald Spencer, Douglas Selander, Frank Grillo, and John 
Marsala, entered cooperating plea agreements, prior to trial, to 
informations stemming from the same investigation. 
 
5. Prior to sentencing, Wynn requested a competency hearing nunc pro 
tunc, alleging that he had suffered from a mental disability which had 
prevented him from fully participating in his trial. At the government's 
request, the district court appointed a psychiatrist to examine Wynn. 
The district court then conducted a competency hearing with testimony 
from the court-appointed psychiatrist and from the psychiatrist who had 
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imprisonment and ordered to pay a special assessment of 
$200. Wynn was sentenced to 52 months' imprisonment, 
followed by three years of supervised release. A $50,000 
fine was also imposed on Wynn. 
 
II. 
 
We first address whether Counts II, III and IV of the 
indictment, charging manipulation of the stocks of each of 
the three public shell companies, were duplicitous. This is 
a legal question requiring plenary review. United States v. 
Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 
The indictment charged Wynn and Haddy with engaging 
in a fraudulent scheme to design to manipulate the price of 
Vista (Count II), Castleton (Count III) and Bellatrix (Count 
IV) securities.6 Wynn and Haddy contend that each 
individual transaction relating to the individual securities 
should have been charged in a separate count. Charging an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
treated Wynn during trial. After the hearing and argument, the district 
court denied Wynn's motion to be declared incompetent nunc pro tunc. 
The court also denied accompanying motions for a new trial based on 
Wynn's alleged incompetence and additional post-trial motions brought 
by both defendants. 
 
6. The relevant portion of Count II reads: 
 
        From at least as early as in or about January 1988, to at least as 
       late as in or about December, 1988, in the District of New Jersey 
       and elsewhere, the defendants Eric Wynn . . . Brad Haddy . . . and 
       others . . . knowingly and willfully employed a scheme to defraud 
in 
       connection with the purchase and sale of Vista Securities, through 
       the use of means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and 
       of the mails, in that they took actions designed to manipulate the 
       price of Vista Securities, all as set forth in Count I of this 
       indictment. 
 
        In violation of Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78j(b) and 
       78ff, Title 18, United States Code, Section 2, and Title 17, Code 
of 
       Federal Regulations, Section 240.10b-5. 
 
Counts III and IV were identical except in the identification of the 
particular security and dates involved. The stock manipulation related to 
Castleton (Count III) and Bellatrix (Count IV) occurred between June and 
December of 1988. 
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overall scheme, they argue, renders the indictment faulty 
because of its duplicity. 
 
Duplicity is the improper joining of distinct and separate 
offenses in a single count. United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 
112, 116 (3d Cir. 1975). Duplicitous counts may conceal 
the specific charges, prevent the jury from deciding guilt or 
innocence with respect to a particular offense, exploit the 
risk of prejudicial, evidentiary rulings, id. at 116-17, or 
endanger fair sentencing. United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 
54, 58 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 
We must ascertain the allowable unit of prosection to 
decide if the counts of the indictment properly charge a 
violation of the pertinent statute. United States v. Amick, 
439 F.2d 351, 359 (7th Cir. 1971), see also United States v. 
Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 1992) (multiplicity7 case 
holding that indictment must follow statute creating 
offense). Congressional intent dictates the proper unit of 
prosecution. United States v. Cooper, 966 F.2d 936, 942 
(5th Cir. 1992). 
 
The starting point in determining the intent of Congress 
is, of course, the language of the statute. 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b), 
commonly known as section 10(b), by its title, proscribes 
employment of manipulative deceptive devices in 
connection with securities transactions. The section reads: 
 
       S 78j. Manipulative and deceptive devices.  
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
       indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality 
       of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility 
       of any national securities exchange -- 
 
       *** 
 
       (b) to use or employ, in any connection with the 
       purchase or sale of any security registered on the 
       national securities exchange or any security not so 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Indictments charging a single offense in different counts are 
multiplicitous. Multiplicity may result in multiple sentences for a single 
offense in violation of double jeopardy, or otherwise prejudice the 
defendant. United States v. Cooper, 966 F.2d 936, 942 n.9 (5th Cir. 
1992). 
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       registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or 
       contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
       regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
       necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
       the protection of investors. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 78j(b). 
 
Under the authority of this section, the SEC promulgated 
Rule 10b-5 to execute enforcement of section 10(b). The 
regulation makes it unlawful for any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of security, to (1) employ a device, 
scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) make any false statement 
of material fact; or, (3) engage in any act, practice or course 
of business that operates as fraud or deceit upon any 
person. The clear wording of the statute and the rule thus 
emphasize the use of manipulative devices in describing the 
offense. The phrase "in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities" positions the illegal activity within the 
framework of the Securities Exchange Act; it does not 
describe the prohibited conduct. 
 
The Supreme Court has interpreted section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 expansively in accordance with its view of 
Congress' intent in enacting the 1934 Act as a vehicle to 
minimize fraud in securities trading. As the Court stated in 
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128, 151 (1972), "These proscriptions, by statute and rule, 
are broad and, . . . obviously meant to be inclusive." The 
legislation is construed " `flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
purpose,' " id. (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)), not"technically 
and restrictively." Id. 
 
The particular counts of the indictment before us track 
the statutory and regulatory language. They describe the 
manipulative implementation of a securities trading 
scheme, the precise activity described in the statute and 
the implementing rule as illegal. Here, the device was a 
four-part scheme in which the buying and selling of 
securities was a segment. Without the boxing, the 
generation of demand, the contrived rise of the price and 
the sale at the profit, however, any particular transaction 
might not be unlawful. Rather, the purchase or sale was 
intended to further the manipulation of the stock price. 
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We thus conclude that the individual purchase or sale 
was not the appropriate unit of prosecution here; these 
retail events were only a step in the advancement of the 
scheme as a whole. On the facts here, each count properly 
charged a manipulation of the securities of each of the 
three separate companies -- each involving a discrete 
scheme. 
 
In resolving this issue, we decline to dictate an inflexible 
rule regarding the allowable unit of prosecution in a 
securities fraud case. The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure require that an indictment be a "plain, concise, 
and definite written statement of the essential facts 
constituting the offense charged." Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). 
Here, the offenses charged were schemes designed to 
manipulate the prices of securities. It may be that other 
violations of the securities laws would lend themselves to a 
differently enumerated indictment. For example, in a 
multiplicity case, United States v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798 
(11th Cir. 1991), the issue was whether the use of multiple 
mailings in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit securities 
fraud in violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could 
form the basis of separate counts of an indictment. The 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided that it 
could not. In so concluding, the Eleventh Circuit recognized 
that the allowable unit of prosecution under section 10(b) is 
the use of a manipulative device or contrivance. Id. at 803. 
The court decided, however, that the overall scheme need 
not be charged in a single count. Instead, any false 
statement in connection with a discrete sale can be 
considered an appropriate unit of prosecution. Id. Langford 
does not mandate, however, that each sale must form the 
basis of a count of the indictment. Rather, it clarified that 
in addition to the allowable prosecution of a scheme to 
defraud, it can be something less. 
 
Finally, on this issue, we observe that even if the 
indictments were duplicitous, the error would be harmless. 
None of the concerns of duplicity have been implicated. 
There is no allegation here that the integrity of the 
prosecution was compromised by the particular structure of 
the indictment. Therefore, we conclude that counts II, III 
and IV of the indictment, each involving a course of activity 
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yet a single scheme, properly charged Haddy and Wynn 
with violations of the securities laws. 
 
III. 
 
Reliance Requirement 
 
Haddy and Wynn also argue that their convictions should 
be reversed because the government did not prove that 
investors actually relied upon fraudulent and manipulative 
practices in purchasing or selling the subject securities. 
The specific question is whether reliance is an element of 
the crime of stock manipulation, proof of which is essential 
to conviction. We hold that no such statutory requirement 
exists. 
 
The federal securities law were enacted largely in 
response to the stock market crash of 1929. Congress 
recognized the need for investors to be protected against 
fraud, and that if regulatory control in the securities 
industry had been in place, the turbulence created by the 
crash may have, at least, been abated. S. Rep. No. 1445, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1934). Thus, in the interest of 
preventing practices that destabilized the securities market, 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 established systems requiring full disclosure of 
material information by companies transacting in 
securities. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 
(1976). The Securities and Exchange Commission then 
promulgated Rule 10b-5 in 1942 to achieve the remedial 
purposes of the 1934 Act. As we mentioned above, the 
Supreme Court has opined that these laws should be 
flexibly applied. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 151. 
 
We again look first to the statutory language to define the 
contours of the offense. Neither the statute nor the rule 
includes a reliance requirement. Instead, both section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 prohibit the employment of manipulative 
and deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities. 
 
Section 10(b)'s omission of reference to a particular 
victim is compelling evidence that investor reliance is not 
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required for a securities fraud conviction. The language 
does not proscribe deception on a purchaser or seller of a 
security; instead it speaks to deceptive devices employed "in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 
United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (1997). 
 
Rule 10b-5 also prohibits deceptive devices "as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors." Under this regulation, the SEC is authorized to 
prohibit deceptive acts that it concludes would have 
deleterious effect on the integrity of the securities market 
and on investor confidence. See 15 U.S.C. S 78b (purpose of 
Exchange Act is "to insure the maintenance of fair and 
honest markets"). This clear language obviates the 
necessity of identification of a specific victim who acted 
upon the deception. 
 
In United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), the 
Supreme Court rejected the contention that section 17a of 
the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits any device, 
scheme or artifice to defraud in the offer or sale of any 
securities, requires that the deception be perpetrated on the 
individual purchasing the stock. In Naftalin, an investor 
was prosecuted for falsely representing to a broker that he 
owned certain stock. The brokers who were deceived 
suffered losses, but not those investors who actually 
purchased the shares. Naftalin argued that the 1933 Act's 
prohibition against fraud "in" the offer of the sale of 
securities was narrower than section 10(b)'s proscription 
against deception "in connection with" the purchase or sale 
and, accordingly did not encompass deception directed at 
brokers. The Court expressed doubt that the phrases of the 
two Acts had different scopes; but, even assuming a 
narrower reach of the 1933 Act, the Court rejected the 
argument that it was limited to fraud on investors. Id. at 
773 n.4. The Court interpreted section 17a as requiring 
only that the fraud occur "in" an offer or sale of securities. 
Id. at 772-73. We read Naftalin, then, as teaching that if 
fraud "in" a securities transaction, as prohibited by the 
1933 Act, does not require fraud on an investor, then 
deception "in connection with" a securities transaction per 
the 1934 Act does not have such a requirement. 
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Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 
(1975) concerned a private right of action under the 
securities laws, but is nonetheless instructive on the 
question of reliance by identifiable victims in a criminal 
case. In Blue Chips, the Court limited the class of persons 
who may bring an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b- 
5 to those who would actually purchase or sell securities. 
The Court imposed the purchase or sell requirement for 
standing purposes - recognizing the danger of litigation by 
investors who did not make an actual purchase but who 
might later claim that they would have but for the alleged 
deceptive conduct. Id. at 747. Significantly, in Naftalin, the 
Court made clear that the purchaser-seller standing rule of 
Blue Chips is "inapplicable" to a criminal prosecution. 441 
U.S. at 774 n.6. 
 
The statutory term "manipulation" also detracts from a 
theory that specific investor reliance is required. In Santa 
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977), 
the Supreme Court offered that manipulation is virtually a 
term of art in securities law and refers to conduct 
artificially affecting market activity in order to mislead 
investors. The activity described here falls within the 
confines of this description. Wynn and Haddy devised a 
scheme by which the prices of certain securities did not 
reflect market trends, but rather, were induced by their 
contrivances affecting the price of the stock. The allocation 
of the stock, the controlled dissemination of insider 
information, and the offering of bribes had the impact of 
artificially influencing market activity. A particular 
investor's reliance on the representations is the anticipated 
response, but it is not an element of the offense. 
 
The issue of investor reliance was recently decided by the 
Supreme Court in O'Hagan in the context of a 
misappropriation case. Under the misappropriation theory, 
securities fraud is committed when a person, in connection 
with a securities transaction, misappropriates confidential 
information in breach of a duty to the source of the 
information. 117 S.Ct. at 2207. 
 
The O'Hagan defendant was a partner of a lawfirm 
which had been retained as local counsel by a company 
that was planning to acquire a second company. During the 
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preparation stages of the acquisition, O'Hagan purchased 
call options for the target company stock, as well as shares 
in the target company. Following the public announcement 
of the tender offer, the lawyer exercised his call options, 
liquidated his position and realized a profit in excess of four 
million dollars. The Supreme Court upheld O'Hagan's 
conviction under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 on a 
misappropriation theory of securities fraud. The Court 
noted that the theory comports with 10(b)'s language, 
which requires deception "in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security," not deception of an individual 
purchaser or seller. Id. At 2210. Thus, although O'Hagan 
differs by virtue of the theory the prosecution pursued, it is 
strong affirmation of the language of Nafatlin and Blue 
Chips that convictions under the securities laws do not 
require identification of or reliance by a particular victim. 
What distinguishes misappropriation from manipulation is 
the party to whom disclosure was not afforded. With 
manipulation, it is the investors who are deceived. With 
misappropriation, it is the source of the information, in 
most instances, the corporation involved. This distinction 
does not change the fact that the integrity of the free 
market has been compromised. 
 
We therefore conclude that reliance on the deceptive 
practice by an identifiable victim participating in a 
securities transaction is not required for conviction in the 
type of stock manipulation case before us.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. United States v. Russo, 74 F.3d 1383 (2d Cir. 1996), is not to the 
contrary. In Russo, the defendants were convicted in a stock 
manipulation scheme which involved short sales of high value stocks by 
a market maker to generate false credits in an account with a clearing 
broker. The district court instructed the jury that in order to find the 
defendants guilty of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 securities fraud, it 
must find that the clearing broker was deceived. The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that the instruction was proper because "it 
fairly apprised the jury of the essence of the defense theory...." Id. at 
1393. The case did not hold, nor was it an issue, that reliance is a 
required element in a securities fraud case. 
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IV. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons above, we will affirm the judgments in 
these criminal cases. 
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